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TRANSPARENCY AND EFFICIENCY TO “YES”: SUPPORT OF
THE APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLED EVALUATIVE
MEDIATION IN PROPERTY HOLDOUT SITUATIONS
Dennis A. Durkin, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Holdout property owners: who are they and what are their
interests? The answer to this, of course, is relative to which side defines
the term, and will be more fully analyzed throughout this Comment.
Most fundamentally, however, holdout situations take place when
existing landowners resist selling during “property assemblages” of
multiple properties by either private developers or the government
that occur for the purpose of a larger development.1 As a result of this
refusal to sell, one frequent perception of holdouts is that their goal is
to either “seek increased compensation” for their properties or to
simply resist “new development in the area.”2 From the developer’s
perspective, these holdouts boil down to opportunistic property
owners seeking to capitalize on the fact that a developer’s inability to
acquire any one property can effectively halt the entire development.3
Scholars have argued that this opportunistic gaming of circumstances,
at times, prevents “socially desirable” transfers from occurring.4
On the other hand, from the property owner’s perspective, he is
often refusing to sell for a variety of non-monetary reasons, such as

* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., 2011, magna cum
laude, Fairfield University. Thank you to Professor Angela Carmella for her guidance
throughout the writing of this Comment. I am also deeply thankful to my friends and
family for their continued love and support, especially my parents, siblings, and wifeto-be, Kaitlin.
1
Makowski v. Mayor of Balt., 94 A.3d 91, 101–02 (Md. 2014) (citing Mayor of
Balt. v. Valsamaki, 916 A.2d 324, 344 n.18 (Md. 2007)).
2
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 495–96 (2005).
3
Valsamaki, 916 A.2d at 345 n.18.
4
Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale
Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 19 (2006),
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3043&context=clr
(referencing property owners who become aware of a large project requiring their
respective properties and who subsequently hold out for “inflated prices”).
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sentimental attachment to his home.5 For instance, in a 2006
publicized episode illustrating the combination of both financial and
non-financial rationale for refusing to sell to a large development, Vera
Coking refused a nearly two million dollar offer from Donald Trump
to purchase her Atlantic City property; in July 2014, this property had
an auction reserve price of $199,000.6 Ms. Coking’s grandson has
stated that Ms. Coking does not regret the decision because she did
not view any of the offers as “reasonable”: “[a] few million dollars may
sound like a lot, but it’s not for the place she loved.”7
As an additional example of the non-monetary rationale for
refusing to sell to a large development, the story of Edith Macefield,
who was the alleged inspiration for the film UP, proves illustrative.8
Although her house later sold for $310,000 in March of 2014, Ms.
Macefield previously refused a one million dollar offer from
developers seeking to build a mall in Seattle, Washington.9 Ms.
Macefield stated that she did not wish to make a grand statement by
standing up to a large development, but rather, had strong sentimental
attachment to the property.10

5

Lucas J. Asper, The Fair Market Value Method of Property Valuation in Eminent
Domain: “Just Compensation” or Just Barely Compensating?, 58 S.C. L. REV. 489, 491 (2007)
(“Subjective value in the home results from the personal dignity and social status that
accompany homeownership, as well as the sentimental value an individual places on
the home and surrounding land.”). See also Brian Angelo Lee, Just Undercompensation:
The Idiosyncratic Premium in Eminent Domain, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 593, 595 (2013)
(“[T]he owner of a house may have great sentimental attachment to the property
because of happy memories of watching her children grow up there, but the market
neither knows nor cares about her memories, so their value to her is not reflected in
the property’s market price. As a result, there is a substantial gap—a “subjective
premium”—between the compensation that owners receive when they are paid the
market value of their property and the substantially higher value that the owners
themselves actually place on that property.”).
6
Matt A.V. Chaban, A Homeowner’s Refusal to Cash Out in a Gambling Town Proves
Costly, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2014, at A19, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/22/
nyregion/a-homeowner-who-refused-to-cash-out-in-a-gambling-town-may-have-missedher-chance.html.
7
Id.
8
Dominic Kelly, The Story of The Woman Who Turned Down $1 Million For Her
VIEWS
(Mar.
21,
2014),
Historic
Seattle
Home,
OPPOSING
http://www.opposingviews.com/i/society/story-woman-who-turned-down-1-millionher-historic-seattle-home.
9
Id.
10
Id. (quoting Ms. Macefield as stating: “Where would I go? . . . I don’t have any
family and this is my home. My mother died here, on this very couch. I came back to
America from England to take care of her. She made me promise I would let her die
at home and not in some facility, and I kept that promise. And this is where I want to
die. Right in my own home. On this couch.”).
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This Comment will analyze the competing and divergent ways in
which holdout property owners (“holdouts”) and developers perceive
each other. Part II of the Comment examines the case history of the
Eminent Domain Clause,11 starting with an analysis of the seminal cases
in this area and culminating in a discussion of the most recent
decisions from both state courts and the United States Supreme
Court.12 Additionally, this Part, through the analysis of Rick v. West,
compares the holdouts in real property eminent domain proceedings
to those holdouts refusing to release covenants.13 Part III examines
and evaluates the various recommended methods to circumvent or
resolve a holdout situation, such as “secret buying agents”14 and “land
assembly districts.”15 Part IV proposes an additional possible solution
to the holdout problem as an alternative to eminent domain:
alternative dispute resolution. This Part first surveys both the
evaluative and transformative mediation models. Part IV then
ultimately espouses that alternate dispute resolution, in the form of
evaluative mediation that implements a negotiating framework based
on Getting to Yes16 principles, represents a transparent and efficient
avenue to solutions for both the developer and the holdout property
owner.
II. HISTORY OF HOLDOUTS IN EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS
A. Real Property Holdouts
Scholars have observed that the Supreme Court addressed the
“connection between eminent domain and the holdout problem” in
its first decision involving the federal government’s eminent domain
power.17 The Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions in this area, up
until Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,18 “signaled that almost any
governmental taking, including a taking involving a private transfer,
would qualify as a legitimate public use.”19
11

U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.”).
12
See infra Part II.
13
Rick v. West, 228 N.Y.S.2d 195 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962).
14
Kelly, supra note 4.
15
Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1465,
1469–70 (2008).
16
ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN (2d ed. 1991).
17
Kelly, supra note 4, at 10 (citing Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875)).
18
Id. at 11 (citing Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 230–31 (1984)).
19
Id. at 12 (citing Mark C. Landry, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain-A
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For nearly twenty years after Midkiff, the Supreme Court did not
decide a “major public use case”20 This changed with the Kelo v. City of
New London decision.21 In Kelo, nine owners of fifteen properties,
including Susette Kelo, refused to sell to a development corporation22
that planned to replace the homes with privately owned office
buildings and a hotel in order to capitalize on a new research facility
for a large pharmaceutical company.23 After having successfully
negotiated with the majority of property owners within the planned
development, city officials in New London argued that the
condemnations were justifiable because of the extended condition of
the city as a “depressed municipality.”24 In a split decision, the Court
found the transfer of property from one private owner to another in
the interest of economic development to constitute a legitimate
“public use.”25 Justice O’Connor’s dissent vigorously argued that this
was much too expansive and that “all private property is now
vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another private owner, so
long as it might be upgraded.”26
In the immediate aftermath of Kelo, Ohio was the first state to
confront the “economic redevelopment takings”27 issue. In Norwood v.
Horney, the Supreme Court of Ohio refused to “extend state law to the
extent allowed by Kelo.”28 Norwood dealt with a situation where a
developer was predominantly able to have property owners within a
potential development sell their properties voluntarily, but a small
minority refused to do so.29 In its ruling, the court emphasized the

Requiem, 60 TUL. L. REV. 419, 430 (1985)).
20
Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An
Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491, 516
(2006).
21
Id. (citing Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 470 (2005)).
22
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494–95.
23
Id. at 474.
24
Id. at 504. The New London legislature characterized the city as a “depressed
municipality” because of its “ailing economy.” Id. at 469.
25
Id. at 484–86.
26
Id. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Under the banner of economic
development, all private property is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to
another private owner, so long as it might be upgraded—i.e., given to an owner who
will use it in a way that the legislature deems more beneficial to the public—in the
process.”).
27
Erik Stock, “We Were All Born on It. And Some of Us Was Killed on It”: Adopting A
Transformative Model in Eminent Domain Mediation, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 687,
691 (2008) (citing Ian Urbina, Ohio Supreme Court Rejects Taking of Homes for Project, N.Y.
TIMES, July 27, 2006, at A18).
28
Id. (citing Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1128 (Ohio 2006)).
29
Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1124–25.
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importance of individual property rights, which are thought “to be
derived fundamentally from a higher authority and natural law” and
are “so sacred that they could not be entrusted lightly to ‘the uncertain
virtue of those who govern.’”30
In Norwood, a city sought to acquire property from existing owners
and transfer it to another private entity as a part of an “urban renewal
plan” for a “deteriorating area.”31 The court declined to allow such a
transfer through eminent domain, noting that “judicial review of the
taking is paramount” when the government seeks to seize private
property and transfer it to another private entity.32 The court here
observed that the commingling of the private and public interests in
such cases creates the possibility that the government’s decision to
impose eminent domain “may be influenced by the financial gains that
would flow to it or to the private entity because of the taking.”33
An additional case that serves to exemplify the use of eminent
domain in holdout situations is a 2010 New York Court of Appeals
ruling regarding Columbia University’s acquisition of land to expand
its campus.34 The court in Matter of Kaur v. New York State Urban
Development Corporation allowed Columbia to effectuate the taking of
seventeen acres for a satellite campus in West Harlem, New York.35 The
holdouts challenging the condemnation were several business owners
within the zone of the potential development who contended that the
blight findings that allowed the taking were illegitimate and “only
serve[d] the private interests of Columbia.”36 The court, however,
reasoned that, since an earlier state decision held that the Brooklyn
Nets basketball arena served a “public purpose,” then the educational
promotion of Columbia University, although private, was also
authorized as serving an equal, if not greater, “public purpose.”37 The
court favorably cited the anticipated additional benefits of the campus
in Harlem, including the development of two acres of park-like space,
a stimulus to job growth in the local area through the anticipated
hiring of 14,000 people for the construction site area, and upgrades to

30

Id. at 1128 (citing Parham v. Justices of Decatur Cty. Inferior Court, 9 Ga. 341,
348 (Ga. 1851)).
31
Id. at 1115.
32
Id. at 1139.
33
Id. at 1140.
34
Kaur v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010).
35
Id. at 724.
36
Id. at 724, 730.
37
Id. at 734 (citing Develop Don’t Destroy (Brooklyn) v. Urban Dev. Corp., 874
N.Y.S.2d 414 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)).

DURKIN (DO NOT DELETE)

1092

5/13/2016 12:56 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1087

the overall transit infrastructure in Harlem.38 Scholarly interpretation
of this decision argues that the standards for review and deference that
the decision of the New York Court of Appeals gave preserves the
“tradition of broad eminent domain power in New York by limiting the
judiciary’s power to invalidate state condemnations.”39
Makowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore provides an
additional, even more recent example of the potential adverse
outcomes that complete litigation can bring for a holdout in a
condemnation proceeding.40 In this case, the City of Baltimore sought
to immediately take possession of an existing property owner’s office
building.41 In recounting the facts that the trial level found, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland drew attention to the history of the East
Baltimore neighborhood that was the subject of the proceeding.42 In
particular, the court noted the neighborhood’s historic loss of
manufacturing jobs, dating as far back as the 1950s and continuing
throughout the economic decline into the 1990s.43 This continued loss
of jobs carried with it corresponding deleterious impacts to the
community, including substantial crime rates and population
decreases, which collectively forced the neighborhood’s property
values precipitously down and produced the image of East Baltimore
as a “proverbial ghost town.”44
As an initial effort to ameliorate these problems, Baltimore
attempted to restore buildings within this zone on an individual basis.45
These efforts, however, did not work to effectively combat the “urban
decay.”46 As a result, the city refocused its efforts of rehabilitating the
neighborhood to a more “comprehensive” plan, which aimed to
achieve “massive revitalization.”47 This plan focused on redeveloping
eighty-eight acres near Johns Hopkins University Medical Center
through the construction of buildings for such purposes as
biotechnology research and senior housing.48
38

Id. at 729.
Matthew Pickel, Standing Pat in a Post-Kelo World: Preservation of Broad Eminent
Domain Power in Kaur v. New York State Development Corp., 52 B.C. L. REV. 257, 259
(2011).
40
Makowski v. Mayor of Balt., 94 A.3d 91 (Md. 2014).
41
Id. at 92–94.
42
Id. at 94–95.
43
Id. at 94.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 94.
46
Makowski, 94 A.3d at 95.
47
Id.
48
Id.
39
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Before delving into the ultimate ruling in Makowski, it is sensible
to first examine the cases to which the court cited in support of its
ultimate ruling on this holdout situation: Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore City v. Valsamaki49 and Sapero v. Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore.50 Valsamaki involved Baltimore’s attempt to use quick-take
condemnation.51 The court held that the city must establish the
reasons that require the city to possess a respective property
immediately.52 The court additionally set forth the proposition that an
impasse in negotiations for a property as part of a development does
not allow for quick-take condemnation, since regular condemnation
that affords “procedural due process protections” is still available in
that event.53 Furthermore, the court also examined the definition of a
holdout and indicated that a failure to show the presence of a holdout
situation in conjunction with the failure to show immediate necessity
for possession would defeat a quick-take claim.54
The Maryland Court of Appeals, two months after its decision in
Valsamaki, again examined the idea of the holdout in a quick-title
action in Sapero.55 As in Valsamaki, the court in Sapero noted that there
was potential for permitting a quick-take condemnation in the event
of necessity, but held that the facts of the case, which demonstrated
proposals that the city had received to redevelop the land, amongst
other things, did not establish such necessity.56 Sapero additionally
noted that the city’s lack of necessity manifested itself through its
decision to stall the continuation of condemnation proceedings for
over a year to instead go forward with the quick-take action that
effectively “curtailed the property owner’s ability to present a
defense.”57
Applying the same standards espoused in both Valsamaki and
Sapero, the court in Makowski held that the presence of a holdout in
this case warranted the use of quick-take condemnation.58 The court
observed that the property owner was indeed a holdout who made
immediate possession necessary because the owner at issue was the
49

Mayor of Balt. v. Valsamaki, 916 A.2d 324 (Md. 2007).
Sapero v. Mayor of Balt., 920 A.2d 1061 (Md. 2007).
51
Valsamaki, 916 A.2d at 326. Quick-take condemnation allows a municipality to
obtain “immediate possession and immediate title to a particular property.” Id. at 327.
52
Id. at 324.
53
Id. at 346.
54
Id. at 345 n.18.
55
Makowski v. Mayor of Balt., 94 A.3d 91, 104 (Md. 2014).
56
Sapero v. Mayor of Balt., 920 A.2d 1061 (Md. 2007).
57
Id. at 1076.
58
Makowski, 94 A.3d at 102.
50
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only one in a block of over one hundred parcels of land who refused
to sell, and his refusal obstructed the broader “urban renewal plan.”59
The court proceeded to declare that the existing owner “retained
leverage to hold a hammer over the City in order to gain financial
advantage.”60 As support for its assertion, the court noted that
governments seeking to develop public projects suffer from unequal
bargaining power as a result of public knowledge of the attempted
acquisition of certain properties.61
B. Residential Covenant Holdouts
While the previous discussion focused primarily on cases of real
property holdouts, the concept of holdouts extends beyond refusing
to sell real property to refusing to release residential covenants.62 For
instance, in the case of Rick v. West, the plaintiffs sought to force the
defendant to release a covenant that restricted the respective land to
single family dwelling status so that the plaintiffs could build a
hospital.63 After the defendant refused, the court held that a covenant
that provides a real benefit to the person seeking to use it is
enforceable.64
In so ruling, Rick noted that the plaintiffs’ predecessor in interest
was free to decide that, as an “inducement to purchasers,” he would
create the residential covenants.65 The court continued to assert that,
since the defendant had established reliance on these covenants, the
covenants would continue to have effect because “it is not a question
of balancing equities or equating the advantages of a hospital on this
site with the effect it would have on defendant’s property.”66 There is,
however, a “reverse damages” scenario where “restrictive covenants
should [not] be enforced unless the parties who seek enforcement pay
compensation to the parties who maintain that changed conditions
have rendered the restrictions unenforceable.”67 In addition, a current
New York statute effectively renders unenforceable “non-substantial”

59

Id. at 105 (citing Steve P. Calandrillo, Eminent Domain Economics: Should “Just
Compensation” Be Abolished, and Would “Takings Insurance” Work Instead?, 64 OHIO ST.
L.J. 451, 468–69 (2003)).
60
Id. at 106.
61
Id. at 105.
62
Rick v. West, 228 N.Y.S.2d 195 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962).
63
Id. at 196.
64
Id. at 201.
65
Id. at 200.
66
Id.
67
JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 933 n.1 (8th ed. 2014).
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restrictions on the use of land.68
The situation in Rick is, in a way, analogous to the large developer
who seeks to take the land of an existing owner to put it to a supposedly
better use for the public.69 The court in Rick held that such a
consideration of the competing equities to determine the supposed
best societal use was not warranted.70 So, the question then becomes,
what techniques are there to confront the “holdout” in either the real
property or residential covenant context?71
III. COMPARATIVE SURVEY AND ANALYSIS OF PROFFERED SOLUTIONS
A. Secret Purchasing Agents
One proposed alternative to eminent domain for confronting a
real property holdout situation is the use of secret purchasing agents.72
This proposal makes the observation that the government customarily
must make use of its eminent domain power to avoid a holdout
situation.73 The proposal discerns, however, that private parties can
circumvent the use of eminent domain through the use of undisclosed
agents, which can make “the use of eminent domain for private parties
unnecessary and indeed undesirable.”74
Daniel Kelly, an advocate for this solution, notes that secret
purchasing agents, as seen in the situation of a private party’s seeking
to purchase the properties on a development plan, derive their
foundational legitimacy from agency law.75 For agency law purposes in
this area, the developer acts as the principal and authorizes the secret
purchaser to act as an agent to deal with the third-party existing
owner.76 The way in which these purchases occur is through a “doubleblind acquisition system,” where neither the existing owner nor the
buying agent is aware of the larger development requiring the
purchase of the property.77 This would potentially address a central
issue of the holdout problem: differentiating between those existing
owners who are refusing to sell in order to achieve an inflated price
68

Id. at 934 n.2 (citing N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS § 951 (2016)).
See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 494 (2005) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
70
Rick, 228 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
71
See infra Part III.
72
Kelly, supra note 4.
73
Id. at 1.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 21–22.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 20–21.
69
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versus those who are not.78 Since purely governmental use of eminent
domain is “subject to democratic deliberation” and thus becomes
public knowledge, sovereign use of secret buying agents to forego
eminent domain proceedings generally does not occur.79
This proposed solution ultimately seeks to prevent “socially
undesirable” transfers of land that might otherwise occur in certain
circumstances where eminent domain is used to transfer land to
private parties.80 These “inefficient transfers” occur because courts
have no way of understanding an owner’s subjective value and instead
rely on an objective metric: fair market value.81 This sometimes
“socially undesirable” outcome, Kelly observes, also happens in
situations where “properties in a purportedly blighted neighborhood
are valued more highly by the existing owners than by the assembler.”82
There are notable examples of large-scale implementations of
secret purchasing agents.83 For instance, Harvard University, in an
attempt to circumvent a potential holdout issue involving an existing
property owner seeking an inflated price, used secret purchasing
agents to purchase multiple parcels of land at a total cost of eightyeight million dollars.84 Likewise, Disney also used these agents to amass
over one thousand acres of land for its theme parks.85 Disney primarily
took advantage of the secret purchasing agents to “overcome potential
strategic behavior among sellers.”86
While these instances certainly provide illustrations of the
potential efficacy of secret purchasing agents, there are also
countervailing risks associated with the mechanism.87 These risks
include: (1) foregoing positive externalities; (2) long durations of
assembly and the possibility of collusion; and (3) distrust in the
system.88 The use of purchasing agents will potentially fail to overcome
disincentives to development in instances where the societal benefit is
greater than the value of the properties of the existing owners but
78

Kelly, supra note 4, at 24.
Id. at 1.
80
Id. at 25.
81
Id. at 6–7.
82
Id. at 58.
83
Id. at 6.
84
Kelly, supra note 4, at 6.
85
Id. (citing Mark Andrews, Disney Assembled Cast of Buyers to Amass Land Stage for
Kingdom, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 30, 1993, at K-2).
86
Id. at 22–23 (citing Tim O’Reiley, Playing Secret Agent for Mickey Mouse, LEGAL
TIMES, Jan. 10, 1994, at 2).
87
Id. at 41–49.
88
Id.
79

DURNKIN (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

5/13/2016 12:56 PM

COMMENT

1097

where the private benefit is lower than the value of those properties.89
In these cases, the private party will not receive sufficient inducement
to proceed with the development—even with secret purchasing
agents—and a project that would have a net societal benefit will not
take place.90
In addition, the use of secret purchasing agents carries with it an
elongated bargaining process and the threat of collusion.91 For
example, the use of secret purchasing agents is often a time-intensive
process because it requires bargaining with each existing owner,
whereas eminent domain allows for relatively instantaneous
acquisitions.92 While eminent domain still might require years of
litigation,93 its use is potentially preferable to secret purchasing agents
where the development necessitates expedience.94 Furthermore, there
exists a possibility of collusion in the process between the agent and
the existing owner where the agent, if cognizant of the larger
development, could either inform the owner of the development or
increase the price offer for a “kickback.”95
Moreover, there exists the issue of creating general distrust in the
system when developers utilize secret purchasing agents.96 Since the
use of these agents is contrary to normal “full disclosure” negotiation,
the practice has the potential to engender the perception of the
developer as “deceptive.”97 In fact, when the owners discover the
hidden developer, the negotiations often fail.98 Existing owners who
find out that they have dealt with secret agents may subsequently lose
their trust in future property transactions.99 This breakdown in trust
can ultimately compel the developer to attempt to make costly amends
with the community, such as where Harvard—in response to public
censure of its use of secret purchasing agents—paid the government
voluntarily.100 Furthermore, even those who have not directly dealt
89

Id. at 42.
Kelly, supra note 4, at 42.
91
Id. at 45–47.
92
Id. at 45 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 40–42 (2d ed.
1977); Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owners: One More Salute
to Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & ECON. 553, 572 (1993); Thomas Merrill, Book Note, Rent
Seeking and the Compensation Principle, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1561, 1570 (1986)).
93
Id.
94
See id.
95
Id. at 46–47.
96
Kelly, supra note 4, at 47–49.
97
Id. at 47.
98
Heller & Hills, supra note 15, at 1468.
99
Kelly, supra note 4, at 47.
100
See id. at 47–48 (citing Marcella Bombardieri, Town Tensions Thawing as Harvard
90
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with secret purchasing agents but become aware of their general
existence may take “wasteful precautions” to determine whether a
buyer is a secret purchasing agent.101
B. Land Assembly Districts
Another proposed alternative to eminent domain for dealing with
the holdout issue is known as the “land assembly district” (LAD).102
This solution aims to provide a way in which property assemblages can
occur “without harming the poor and powerless,” which is the type of
harm that advocates of the proposal believe eminent domain can cause
in certain instances.103 The advocates of this mechanism note that
holdouts pose the problem of “underassembly” in private property
transactions.104 This issue occurs where a developer values a parcel of
a desired assembly higher than the individual owner of that parcel
contained within that assembly, but that owner nevertheless
strategically seeks a higher price, thereby diminishing the interest of
the developer to assemble the properties at all.105
While the government has the power of eminent domain to deal
with this issue, scholars note that eminent domain proceedings can
result in “confiscatory condemnations”106 and often do not compensate
the owner with any “subjective surplus.”107 The proposal seeks to have
the law “retrofit a community with a condominium-like structure.”108
The LAD formation and approval would be subject to a process
“substantially parallel to those involved in existing redevelopment and
condemnation procedures,” but the approving commission would
need to “certify that a LAD is necessary to overcome the problem of
excess fragmentation.”109 This structure places a community into a
district that would require a majority vote to approve the sale of the
district to a “developer or municipality seeking to consolidate the land
into a single parcel.”110 Scholars contend that this would circumvent
Earns Allston’s Trust: University Wins Plaudits with Housing Support, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 4,
2003, at B3).
101
Id. at 48.
102
Heller & Hills, supra note 15, at 1468.
103
Id. at 1467.
104
Id. at 1468 (citing Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in
the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 639, 673–74 (1998)).
105
Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 927–28
(2004).
106
Heller & Hills, supra note 15, at 1527.
107
Id. at 1468.
108
Id. at 1469.
109
Id. at 1489.
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Id. at 1469.

DURNKIN (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

5/13/2016 12:56 PM

COMMENT

1099

the holdout situation because the owners would be subject to a
“collective voting procedure.”111
While this proposal certainly has the potential to mitigate the
holdout problem, it too brings corresponding concerns. For instance,
there exists the risk of “majoritarian tyranny” due to the voting
schematic of the proposal that requires a majority decision.112 This
structure threatens minority property owners, as the majority may
“enact rules solely benefiting itself at the expense of a minority for no
better reason than that the majority can hold together a coalition of
the selfish.”113 Additionally, the majority may vote for a given assembly
when other property owners within it would not do so.114 The
constituent elements of the district’s majority may additionally be
corporate entities, such as real estate investment funds, which may by
their nature perceive the district as a strict investment endeavor and
fail to account for the subjective valuation of any individual property.115
Furthermore, those with “transient” interests within the district could
potentially “gang up on owners with deep connections to their
parcels.”116 Thus, while LADs offer a democratic mechanism to
confront the holdout issue in the real property setting as an alternative
to eminent domain, it may run the risk of failing to adequately protect
the interests of the minority within the district.117
Each of the proposed solutions above offers theoretically
attractive alternatives to the use of eminent domain for dealing with
the holdout situation. Without more widespread acceptance of secret
purchasing agents and in the absence of the creation of LADs,
however, an already available alternative that has proven itself to be a
highly effective tool in numerous other areas will provide a practical
solution to the problem: mediation.

111
112
113
114
115
116
117

See id. at 1469–70.
Heller & Hills, supra note 15, at 1499.
Id.
Id. at 1498.
Id. at 1499.
Id. at 1503.
See supra notes 102–16.
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IV. PROPOSAL FOR MEDIATION THAT USES PRINCIPLED FRAMEWORK
A. Mediation Benefits
The notion of dissuading traditional litigation is not a novel one,
as both federal judges and American Presidents have noted the
potential drawbacks of proceeding to trial.118 Abraham Lincoln, for
instance, exhorted the following: “Discourage litigation. Persuade
your clients to compromise whenever you can. Point out to them how
the nominal winner is often the real loser—in fees, expenses, and waste
of time.”119 Furthermore, and more specifically for purposes of this
Comment, the notion of alternate dispute resolution in the context of
eminent domain proceedings is also well established and has been
used since the 1660s.120
An additional form of alternate dispute resolution used in
eminent domain proceedings, mediation, consists of an independent
mediator engaging with the government and the existing property
owner in order to have both parties come to terms with an agreement
that both sides find suitable.121 The mediation session is dependent on
the will of the parties and can occur at any stage at which the parties
agree to do so.122 In this circumstance, the mediator functions to
“facilitate communication between the parties, identify their respective
interests, and, hopefully, help them resolve the issues on terms with
which both can live.”123 At the mediation session, both parties, with
legal representation, join the mediator.124 The format of the mediation
is subject to tailoring and variation to fit the needs of the parties.125 The
mediation process begins with a joint session involving the parties and
the mediator.126 Then, the mediator conducts separate caucuses with
each party.127 During these caucuses, the mediator separately conveys
offers between the parties through “shuttle diplomacy.”128 Ultimately,
118

Deborah A. Ferguson, Eight Benefits of Mediation, ADVO., Oct. 2012, at 44, 44.
Id.
120
Stock, supra note 27, at 692 (citing LISA JARDINE, THE CURIOUS LIFE OF ROBERT
HOOKE: THE MAN WHO MEASURED LONDON 157–59 (2004)).
121
Stanley Leasure & Ray Gosack, Eminently Sensible: Why Mediation Works in Eminent
Domain Cases, ICMA.ORG (May 27, 2014), http://icma.org/m/en/Article/
104506/Eminently_Sensible.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Leasure & Gosack, supra note 121.
128
Id. Shuttle diplomacy is a process where the mediator is “relaying offers and
counter offers between the parties and continuing to assist the parties and their
119
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the goal is to have the mediator join the parties again to write and sign
a settlement agreement.129
The advantages to mediation include high reports of settlement,
low costs, increased confidentiality, and a greater degree of control.130
Settlement rates for mediation are approximately eighty percent, with
the settlement rate for eminent domain mediations tracking closely to
that figure, albeit with a small sample size of reported settlements.131
For instance, this sample consists of a mediator in Tennessee who has
conducted eminent domain mediations and approximates the
settlement rate of his cases at around eighty percent.132
Furthermore, mediation foregoes the costs associated with
litigation, including the potentially sizeable expenses of “pretrial
attorney fees and costs arising from discovery, depositions, transcripts,
motions, briefs, research, experts and witnesses.”133 The slow nature of
the litigation process further compounds these costs, which increase
over time.134 Eminent domain litigation costs additionally include
“negative public perception.”135 In contrast, mediation is “far less
expensive,” allows the cost of the mediator to be shared equally
amongst the parties, and is generally less time consuming.136
Mediation also offers increased confidentiality, whereas litigation
is often an “extremely public process.”137 This confidentiality comes
about as a result of statutes that prohibit the admission of evidence
concerning the mediation.138 Statutes also view the information
presented to the mediator as protected.139 Furthermore, the parties
can add additional confidentiality protection through any agreed
upon contractual stipulations.140

representatives to analyze the important elements of the case.” Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
TENN. ADVISORY COMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, EMINENT DOMAIN IN
TENNESSEE 9 (2013), https://www.tn.gov/assets/entities/tacir/attachments/
EminentDomain.pdf.
133
Ferguson, supra note 118, at 45.
134
Id.
135
Leasure & Gosack, supra note 121.
136
Ferguson, supra note 118, at 45.
137
Leasure & Gosack, supra note 121.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
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The voluntary nature of mediation allows the parties to exert
significant control over the way in which the process occurs.141 The
parties are not obligated to follow “court-mandated procedures” and
instead have the freedom to define their own process.142 Since the
process is voluntary, the parties can reach a compromise.143 This is in
clear contrast to litigation, where the judgment at trial will create a
“winner and loser.”144 Furthermore, the parties exert autonomy when
they choose the mediator of the dispute.145
B. Examples of the Use of Mediation to Avoid Eminent Domain
Proceedings
A recent example of the use of mediators to avoid eminent
domain litigation is the attempt of Vermont Gas Systems to run
pipeline through various private properties.146 After failing to reach an
agreement with a minority percentage of the affected property owners
for the easements, the company offered those owners the opportunity
to conduct mediations with third-party mediators.147 A spokesperson
for Vermont Gas lauded mediation as an attractive alternative to
eminent domain litigation because it is “quicker and generally
cheaper.”148
Another example of the successful use of mediation to forego
eminent domain proceedings is found in Fort Smith, Arkansas.149 The
city made substantial use of mediation in its efforts to acquire various
properties “for expansion of a regional water-supply lake.”150 Before
beginning the mediations, the town informed the landowners that the
city would pay for the cost of the mediator in order to “encourage
participation.”151 In the group sessions of the mediations, the city made
sure to inform the property owners of the regional benefits of the
project as well as the city’s intention to be fair during the
141

Ferguson, supra note 118.
Leasure & Gosack, supra note 121.
143
Ferguson, supra note 118.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Vermont Gas Offers Landowners Mediation, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2014),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/aug/13/vermont-gas-offerslandowners-mediation/.
147
Id. http://icma.org/m/en/Article/104506/Eminently_Sensible
148
Joel Baird, Vermont Gas Upbeat on Pipeline Mediation, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS
(Aug. 12, 2014, 6:30 PM), http://www.burlingtonfreepress.com/story/news/local/
vermont/2014/08/12/vermont-gas-upbeat-pipeline-mediation/13966905/.
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Leasure & Gosack, supra note 121.
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Id.
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negotiations.152 The mediations were so uniformly successful that each
session resulted in a settlement.153
C. Proposal for Transformative Model
One type of proposed mediation as an alternative to eminent
domain proceedings is based on the “transformative” method.154 This
proposal recognizes that mediation in general may address
“problematic power imbalances inherent in any eminent domain
dispute.”155 The transformative model, along with the “facilitative” and
“evaluative” models, is a “generally accepted mediation [model].”156
The transformative model consists of the least involved mediator, while
the evaluative process implements the most involved mediator of the
three aforementioned models.157 In the transformative process, the
mediator does not unilaterally establish the way in which the mediation
will occur, but rather seeks input from the parties as to how to organize
the session.158 To foster and encourage “engagement” between the
parties, the transformative mediator makes use of unstructured
questioning without suggesting the answer beforehand.159 While the
mediator here is minimally involved, he will nevertheless draw
attention to points in the discussion where one party “recognizes and
acknowledges the perspective of the other.”160
The proposal for transformative mediation supports that model
specifically in the eminent domain context because the minimal
involvement of the transformative mediator may lead to maintenance
of the relationship between the parties.161 An advocate for the
proposal, Erik Stock, notes that the mediator who implements a
transformative methodology seeks “to foster opportunities for the
disputants to experience empowerment and recognition.”162 The
transformative model, Stock argues, will allow the existing owner in an
eminent domain proceeding to feel “empowerment.”163 According to
Stock, the use of the transformative model is particularly appealing in
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163

Id.
Id.
Stock, supra note 27, at 687–88.
Id. at 694–95.
Id. at 696–97.
Id.
Id. at 697.
Id. at 697–98.
Stock, supra note 27, at 697.
Id.
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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this context because eminent domain cases frequently involve parties
located in “neighborhoods lacking in political power,” and the
transformative model affords those parties an opportunity to “gain a
voice in a dispute where they might otherwise have none and
reconnect to the government entity involved in the dispute.”164
Stock goes on to cite the Uniform Mediation Act (“the Act”) as
reinforcement for the transformative model, since the Act emphasizes
“self-determination” in order to create a sense of equity and
satisfaction with the mediation proceeding.165 This transformative
dynamic, according to Stock, is potentially useful because it
necessitates cooperation where there can be a large “emotional and
psychic” discrepancy between the property owner and the government
in eminent domain cases.166 Furthermore, Stock contends that, on a
more macro level, the transformative model will preserve the
relationship between property owners and the government by
engendering “democratic values,” which the scholar deems potentially
greater than reaching a settlement.167 Stock’s conclusion emphasizes
the process value of mediation, where if the property owner feels a
sense of “empowerment” while dealing with the government through
a robust level of control in the mediation itself, then the use of the
transformative method is justified.168
D. Argument for an Evaluative Model of Mediation to Avoid Eminent
Domain Litigation
While the proposal of a transformative model certainly has
appealing and meritorious characteristics, including the
empowerment of the existing owner as discussed supra,169 a holdout
situation may call for more active involvement from the mediator in an
effort to reach a settlement. This active involvement is a chief feature
of evaluative mediation—indeed, it consists of the highest level of
mediator involvement of the three primary mediation models.170
Whereas a transformative mediator takes a predominantly hands-off
approach in an effort to bestow upon the parties a sense of control
over the mediation process, an evaluative mediator focuses much more
on the outcome of the mediation and “will not only encourage
164
165
166
167
168
169
170

Id. at 698.
Id. at 700.
Stock, supra note 27, at 701.
Id. at 702–03.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 696.
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settlement, but will at times propose a particular outcome for the
dispute.”171
In general, an evaluative mediator “focuses on the legal rights of
the parties and evaluates the merits of each party’s claim.”172 A
mediator who implements this methodology seeks to address the
fundamental origin of the controversy.173 While this technique
engenders a “more practical focus than in a purely facilitative
mediation,” it does not do so to neglect either side’s interests.174
A core competency of the evaluative model is the ability of the
mediator to act as an “agent of reality” for the parties.175 The evaluative
mediator acts as such when providing objective and neutral advice.176
The mediator in this evaluative capacity seeks to reach a settlement by
overcoming “unrealistic opinions about the value of [the parties’]
claims.”177 To accomplish this end, an evaluative mediator “provides
new information, helps parties realize the costs and risks of litigation,
and points out weaknesses and strengths of each side.”178
More specifically in the eminent domain context, an evaluative
mediator provides the parties with “opinions on any of the many issues
which arise in eminent domain matters, including the potential
outcome at trial.”179 The evaluative mediator in this context may also
candidly assess the costs and benefits of proceeding to litigate the
issue.180 During this discussion, the evaluative mediator may choose to
present a “verdict range” that incorporates the probability of potential
outcomes within that realm of possibilities.181 Since an evaluative
mediator has this ability to offer opinions on the matter, the use of an
“experienced mediator with eminent domain expertise” serves to
171

Id. at 696–97.
Kenneth M. Roberts, Mediating the Evaluative-Facilitative Debate: Why Both Parties
Are Wrong and a Proposal for Settlement, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 187, 195 (2007) (citing
Murray S. Levin, The Propriety of Evaluative Mediation: Concerns About the Nature and
Quality of an Evaluative Opinion, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 267, 268 (2000)).
173
Id. (citing Richard Birke, Evaluation and Facilitation: Moving Past Either/Or, 2000
J. DISP. RESOL. 309, 313–14 (2000)).
174
Id.
175
Id. at 196 (citing Richard Birke, Evaluation and Facilitation: Moving Past Either/Or,
2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 309, 315 (2000)).
176
See id.
177
Id.
178
Roberts, supra note 172, at 196.
179
Stanley Leasure, Eminent Domain Disputes: The Role of Mediation, RIGHT OF WAY,
Mar./Apr. 2012, at 32, 33, https://www.irwaonline.org/eweb/upload/web_mar_
apr12_EminentDomainMediation.pdf.
180
See id. at 34.
181
See id.
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enhance the session.182
E. Incorporating Principled Framework to Evaluative Model
This Comment proposes that a principled negotiating framework
based on the seminal book Getting to Yes183 will augment the efficacy of
evaluative mediation in the eminent domain context. Scholars have
referred to this work as the “‘Bible’ for cooperative negotiations and
generally a very useful blueprint for mediation.”184 The main precepts
of the work are: “1) separating the people from the problem, 2)
focusing on interests not positions, 3) inventing options for mutual
gain, and 4) using objective criteria.”185
1. Separating the People from the Problem
As to the first principle of “separating the people from the
problem,” the book notes that “[t]he ability to see the situation as the
other side sees it, as difficult as it may be, is one of the most important
skills a negotiator can possess.”186 This ability to analyze the situation
from both sides underscores the evaluative mediator’s goal of objective
assessment of the root causes of the case.187 Furthermore, while this
principle recommends focusing on the problem itself, it does not
disregard the emotions of the parties involved and advises negotiators
to “deal with the people as human beings.”188 Since emotions on the
part of the potential holdouts have the tendency to run high,189 the
evaluative mediator would be prudent to heed the advice of this
principle and recognize these human emotions at the mediation
session, while maintaining a simultaneous but separate focus on the
problem, as the principle suggests.
The use of this principle is highly complementary to evaluative
mediation, which emphasizes the role of the mediator as bringing
objective and neutral reality to the parties.190 Conversely, this principle
is at odds with the precepts of transformative mediation, which does
not separate the people from the problem but instead seeks to have
182

See id. at 33.
FISHER & URY, supra note 16.
184
See, e.g., John Barkai, What’s A Cross-Cultural Mediator to Do? A Low-Context Solution
for a High-Context Problem, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 43, 81 (2008).
185
Id. (discussing FISHER & URY, supra note 16).
186
FISHER & URY, supra note 16, at 23.
187
See Roberts, supra note 172.
188
FISHER & URY, supra note 16, at 39.
189
See, e.g., supra notes 6–10 and accompanying text.
190
See Roberts, supra note 172, at 196 (citing Richard Birke, Evaluation and
Facilitation: Moving Past Either / Or, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 309, 315 (2000)).
183
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the parties feel empowerment over the problem.191 The use of
evaluative mediation with the application of this principle is preferable
to the transformative model in the eminent domain context because,
while it would address the emotional element192 of potentially selling
one’s property, it would not allow these emotions to create “unrealistic
opinions about the value of their claims” that would conceivably
interfere with a settlement.193 For instance, in the example of Vera
Coking, who turned down an offer to sell her property for nearly two
million dollars to Donald Trump only to ultimately have the property
receive an auction reserve price of approximately $1.8 million less than
that offer,194 an evaluative mediator would have acted as an “agent of
reality” to make Ms. Coking aware of this potential precipitous price
decrease as well as the objective assessment of the offer at the time it
was made.195
By adhering to this principle, the evaluative mediator would also
be able to avoid the potential issue of distrust in the system related to
the secret purchasing agent proposal.196 That proposal would
effectively remove the people from the problem through the use of
undisclosed purchasing agents so as to not make an existing owner
aware of a larger development plan, but this practice is often seen as
“deceptive.”197 Indeed, property owners who come to realize that they
have transacted with undisclosed agents may suffer from a breakdown
in trust in future property dealings.198 This “separating the people
from the problem” principle seeks to accomplish just what it claims;
however, it untangles the issue at hand from emotion, but does not
wholly remove the human component.199 Thus, the evaluative
mediator implementing this principle would not have to rely on
deception, as is the potential case with the use of secret purchasing
agents.200 In order to achieve a positive outcome for the parties, the
evaluative mediator can still objectively assess the merits of each party’s
position without conflating the problem with emotion.201 This would
forego the potential costs to the secret purchasing agent proposal,
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201

Stock, supra note 27, at 701.
See FISHER & URY, supra note 16, at 39.
Roberts, supra note 172, at 196.
See Chaban, supra note 6.
Roberts, supra note 172, at 196.
See Kelly, supra note 4, at 47–49.
Id. at 47.
Id.
See FISHER & URY, supra note 16, at 39.
See Kelly, supra note 4, at 47.
See FISHER & URY, supra note 16, at 39.
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including the monetary costs associated with making a financial
apology to the community, as was the case with the Harvard example,202
and the costs associated with precautionary assessments of whether a
buyer is a secret purchasing agent.203
2. Focus on Interests
As to the second principle of “focusing on interests not positions,”
Getting to Yes asserts that, “a close examination of the underlying
interests will reveal the existence of many more interests that are
shared or compatible than ones that are opposed.”204 This focus on
interests by the evaluative mediator would lend itself to separating
those property owners who are holding out for opportunistic reasons
from those holding out for non-monetary reasons.205 For instance, the
evaluative mediator would aim to objectively determine whether
someone like Edith Macefield is actually imputing a sentimental
premium on the value of a given property, is strategically seeking a
higher price knowing that her property is essential to the larger
development scheme, or is indeed attempting to make some sort of
grand statement against the development itself.206 As another example,
in the Columbia University expansion case, the evaluative mediator
would actively seek to establish whether the business-owner holdouts
in that case truly believed that the area was not blighted,207 or whether
the business owners’ true interests for holding out were strategic in
nature.
This is an additional, yet appealing, distinguishing characteristic
of evaluative mediation implementing this principle from the
transformative model, since the transformative mediator would simply
focus on creating the feeling of empowerment amongst the parties.208
While there is a strong argument that this emphasis on the process will
enable the parties to feel a greater sense of control over the
mediation,209 the session may very well conclude without an objective
third party determining the reasoning behind the refusal to sell, which

202

Kelly, supra note 4, at 47–48 (citing Marcella Bombardieri, Town Tensions
Thawing as Harvard Earns Allston’s Trust: University Wins Plaudits with Housing Support,
BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 4, 2003, at B3).
203
Kelly, supra note 4, at 48.
204
FISHER & URY, supra note 16, at 42.
205
See supra Part I.
206
Kelly, supra note 8.
207
Kaur v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 730 (N.Y. 2010).
208
Stock, supra note 27, at 697.
209
Id.
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is the precise determination that this focus on interests promotes.210
This would ultimately better enable the evaluative mediator in the
active promotion of settlement.211
3. Inventing Options for Mutual Gain
Moreover, in reference to the third principle of “inventing
options for mutual gain,” the book notes that, “[i]n a complex
situation, creative inventing is an absolute necessity.
In any
negotiation it may open doors and produce a range of potential
agreements satisfactory to each side.”212 The potential efficacy of the
application of this principle is seen in the result in Rick v. West, a case
in which the construction of a hospital did not occur because of a
holdout’s enforcement of a residential covenant.213 The court held
that it would not conduct a balancing of the potential benefits of a
hospital with the potential burden imposed on the covenant holder if
it were not enforced, but would instead focus on whether the covenantcreated reliance was an “inducement to purchasers.”214 In such a case,
an evaluative mediator implementing this principle would attempt to
come up with a broad range of possible solutions215 that could produce
the ostensibly favorable result of the construction of a hospital, such as
possibly giving the holder of the restrictive covenant some interested
stake in the new hospital for releasing the covenant. In addition, the
evaluative mediator could use his active involvement in the mediation
to create solutions based on the purported benefits of the
development, such as in Matter of Kaur v. New York State Urban
Development Corporation, where an evaluative mediator could potentially
have based a number of creative solutions on the litany of potential
benefits of Columbia University’s expansion, such as its creation of
thousands of jobs and benefits to the local transit system and
environment.216
This is another chief advantage of evaluative mediation over its
transformative counterpart, since the more active involvement of the
evaluative mediator is more conducive to the creation of different,
possible solutions, as opposed to the general passivity of the
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FISHER & URY, supra note 16, at 42.
Id.
Id. at 79–80.
Rick v. West, 228 N.Y.S.2d 195, 201 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962).
Id. at 201.
FISHER & URY, supra note 16, at 79–80.
Kaur v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 734–35 (N.Y. 2010).
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transformative mediator.217 Furthermore, the evaluative mediator
could also present the parties with a probability analysis of these
outcomes if a trial is needed as a backdrop to any other devised
solutions so as to convey the possible risks involved with each
solution.218
4. Establishment of Objective Criteria
Finally, Getting to Yes encourages establishing “objective criteria”
upon which to base the negotiations.219 This measurement, the book
argues, should consider “standards of fairness, efficiency, or scientific
This principle complements the risk-assessment and
merit.”220
opinion-providing function of the evaluative mediator221 by
underscoring the need to establish an objective basis for that
judgment.
One such possible criteria to assist the evaluative mediator’s
creation of a “verdict range”222 would be the use of past holdout case
results. For instance, Kelo could potentially provide caution to the
holdout who is considering creating an impasse at mediation, as the
Supreme Court, albeit in a split decision, asserted the transfer of
property from one private owner to another in the interest of
economic growth to be a permissible “public use.”223 Similarly,
Makowski illustrates another result that the evaluative mediator could
use as an objective benchmark to provide admonition to a would-be
holdout. There, the court provided guidance as to who constitutes a
holdout and ultimately held that the refusal to sell in that case
amounted to interference with the more comprehensive “urban
renewal plan” at issue and thus warranted condemnation.224
Conversely, the evaluative mediator could juxtapose these
potential outcomes with the result in Norwood, which held that
condemnation was not warranted when a municipality attempted to
obtain private property and transfer it to another private party in order
to ostensibly revitalize the city, with the court noting that this raises the
possibility of improper financial benefits to the city or to the private
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Stock, supra note 27, at 697.
Leasure, supra note 179, at 34.
FISHER & URY, supra note 16, at 83.
Id.
See Leasure, supra note 179, at 32–34.
Id. at 34.
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484–86 (2005).
Makowski v. Mayor of Balt., 94 A.3d 91, 101–02 (Md. 2014).
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party to which the property is ultimately transferred.225 Thus, these
case results could provide the evaluative mediator with the tools
necessary to establish the type of “objective criteria” that Getting to Yes
espouses.226
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment began with the definition of a holdout as a
landowner who resists or refuses to sell to a larger development. These
holdouts are often subject to eminent domain proceedings to
effectuate the development. As discussed, various alternatives to
eminent domain exist to deal with the holdout issue, including secret
purchasing agents and land assembly districts. This Comment then
advanced evaluative mediation as a beneficial approach to dealing with
holdouts due to this model’s emphasis on mediator activity and
settlement.
The proposal centered on the general appeal of mediation,
including the cost and control advantages compared to traditional
litigation of eminent domain cases. More specifically, this Comment
argued that evaluative mediation is better suited to reach the needed
settlements in eminent domain cases through the ability of the
mediator to actively provide evaluations of the matter, distinguished
from the general passivity of a transformative mediator. This
Comment then offered a negotiating framework, based on Getting to
Yes principles, to complement and enhance this evaluative mediation.
Using this framework, the mediator will have a strong basis upon which
to conduct these potentially highly emotional holdout cases as well as
to provide independent opinions of these cases based on objective
criteria.
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Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1139–40 (Ohio 2006).
FISHER & URY, supra note 16, at 83.

